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Abstract
We introduce Scantegrity II, a practical enhancement for
optical scan voting systems that achieves increased elec-
tion integrity through the novel use of confirmation codes
printed on ballots in invisible ink. Voters mark ballots
just as in conventional optical scan but using a special
pen that develops the invisible ink. Verifiability of elec-
tion integrity is end-to-end, allowing voters to check that
their votes are correctly included (without revealing their
votes) and allowing anyone to check that the tally is com-
puted correctly from the included votes. Unlike in the
original Scantegrity, dispute resolution neither relies on
paper chits nor requires election officials to recover par-
ticular ballot forms. Scantegrity II works with either
precinct-based or central scan systems. The basic system
has been implemented in open-source Java with off-the-
shelf printing equipment and has been tested in a small
election.
An enhancement to Scantegrity II keeps ballot iden-
tification and other unique information that is revealed
to the voter in the booth from being learned by persons
other than the voter. This modification achieves privacy
that is essentially equivalent to that of ordinary paper bal-
lot systems, allowing manual counting and recounting of
ballots.
1 Introduction
“Trust, but verify.”
—Russian proverb, popularized by Ronald
Reagan during his presidency
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In order to provide increased confidence in the in-
tegrity of election outcomes, modern voting technology
and legislation is moving from a model of trust to one
that provides verifiability1 of some steps in the voting
process. For example, with optical scan systems and
voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT), voters can ver-
ify that their votes are correctly recorded on paper, and
post-election manual recounts can verify that the paper
trail matches the electronically produced tally. End-to-
end (E2E) voting systems2 provide additional, stronger
verifiability. E2E systems allow voters to verify that their
ballots are processed correctly, giving voters assurance
that their votes are cast, collected, and counted as in-
tended. In essence, end-to-end voting systems provide
a verifiable chain of custody on the ballots, from the
start, when the votes are cast, to the end, when they are
counted. They also enable the correctness of the final
tally to be verified by anyone.
We propose Scantegrity II: Invisible Ink, an end-to-
end security enhancement for existing optical scan vot-
ing systems that enables each voter to verify that her
vote is processed correctly, without introducing any new
polling place equipment. Extra information is printed
on optical scan ballots during production, but the un-
derlying method by which voters mark the ballots is not
changed and remains in accordance with legislative pro-
posals requiring “unencrypted” paper audit records. The
E2E verifiability of Scantegrity II is opt-in; the voters
who choose to ignore the additional features will have
a voting experience similar to that with current optical
scan. Additionally, Scantegrity II does not interfere with
1It is often useful to distinguish “verifiability” from “verification.”
Some systems may legally compel a voter to verify certain aspects of
her vote prior to casting it. “Verifiability” herein refers to the ability to
verify and not the legal status of being verified.
2The term “voting system” has traditionally referred to the algo-
rithm for determining an election outcome; however, recently in the
computer science literature, it has been used to refer to various subsys-
tems in the complex system of voting. We follow the latter consensus
herein.
the security provisions of the underlying optical scan sys-
tem: physical observation, validated tallying software,
and recounts.
Contributions Scantegrity II inherits several contribu-
tions from the original Scantegrity.
• End-to-end verifiability of election integrity: Scant-
egrity II allows voters to verify that their choices
are included unmodified in the final tally and al-
lows anyone to verify that the collection of included
choices is counted properly.
• Compatibility with optical scan equipment: Scant-
egrity II is an add-on and does not require any opti-
cal scan polling place equipment to be replaced. It
interfaces cleanly with the underlying optical scan
system, requiring only a modified ballot and access
to the results from the scanners.
• Familiar ballot marking procedure: the voter marks
the bubble beside the candidate she wishes to vote
for, just as she would on a conventional optical scan
ballot. Opting into verifying the strong integrity that
Scantegrity II provides is up to the individual voter.
The basic Scantegrity II scheme, presented in Sec-
tions 3 through 6, provides the following new contribu-
tions.
• Immunity to coercion and “randomization” attacks:
when a voter looks at an unmarked Scantegrity II
ballot, the information she will retain as a receipt
is hidden. Therefore, an attacker cannot force a
voter to mark her ballot in a way that creates a pre-
specified receipt, unlike in some other E2E systems
including the original Scantegrity.
• An improved mechanism for handling disputes:
since confirmation codes are printed in invisible ink,
the election officials can distinguish between seri-
ous claims of discrepancies and spurious ones with-
out resorting to recovery of particular physical bal-
lots, as required in the original Scantegrity. Elec-
tion officials set statistical triggers that detect fraud
while minimizing false positives.
The enhanced version of Scantegrity II, presented in
Section 7, offers further contributions.
• The use of special ink to make ballots appear hu-
manly indistinguishable from each other after they
are cast preserves voter privacy during manual re-
counts or any other inspection of the paper ballots—
whether authorized or not.
• An informational mechanism to provide the voter
with undeniable proof of any error in the posting on
the election website without relying on possession
of a physical document, as does the basic scheme.
Organization In the following section, we discuss
work related to our proposal, including an overview of
the original version of Scantegrity. Section 3 provides
a high-level overview of the voter experience. In Sec-
tion 4, we provide a detailed chronology of each step
in a Scantegrity II election. We discuss the security of
the system in Section 5 and some implementation details
about using invisible ink in Section 6. In Section 7 we
present enhancements to the basic Scantegrity II system
of Sections 3 through 6.
2 Related Work
An end-to-end (E2E) approach to voting strives to pro-
vide verifiability of the integrity of key steps in the vot-
ing process. In particular, it allows verification that all
cast ballots are included unmodified in the collection of
ballots that are counted—a property assured by neither
voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT) nor manual re-
counts. More formally, what have been variously called
E2E, coded vote, cryptographic, or open-audit voting
systems, are systems which preserve ballot secrecy while
providing:
1. Voter Verifiability: some time after casting her bal-
lot, each voter can confirm that her vote was “col-
lected as cast” by checking privacy-preserving re-
ceipt information against a public record of receipts
posted by the election officials.
2. Universal Verifiability: anyone can verify that votes
were “counted as collected”, i.e., the posted tally is
correct with respect to the public record of posted
receipts.
Cryptographic techniques were first applied to vot-
ing by Chaum [5], and Scantegrity II is a descendant
of this paradigm [7, 10, 6]. An earlier paper-based sys-
tem by Chaum [7] provides voter verifiability through a
two-sheet ballot printed by a special printer that uses a
transparent sheet and visual cryptography to show voter
choices in a human-readable format. The voter destroys
one sheet and keeps the other as a privacy-preserving re-
ceipt, a copy of which is publicly posted. It provides uni-
versal verifiability using a process similar to a mixnet [5]
to decode the receipts and recover the plaintext ballots in
an unlinkable manner.
The Punchscan [16, 22] and Preˆt a` Voter [9] systems
use simpler printing. In both systems, positional data
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from a printed ballot is publicly posted for voter ver-
ifiability. Each voter uses information printed on the
unique ballot that indicates which positions correspond
to which candidates in order to mark the ballot and subse-
quently destroys part of that information in order to hide
her choices. To provide universal verifiability, the orig-
inal Preˆt a` Voter uses a mixnet [5] and Punchscan uses
a specialized anonymity network called the Punchboard,
which combines tables of binding commitments [20, 4]
with randomized partial checking (RPC) [17]. It is now
recognized, however, that such particular universal veri-
fiability “system back-ends” can be mixed and matched
with “voter-facing front-ends.” [19, 24]
Both Punchscan and Preˆt a` Voter have numerous de-
sirable security properties [25, 14]. One potential issue,
however, with any such system that publishes per-ballot
contest results, including these two as well as Scant-
egrity, is known as the “Italian attack” or “pattern vot-
ing.” This has been solved for inter-contest patterns us-
ing so-called “contest partitioning” [23]. Another issue
with these previous systems is so-called “randomization
attacks” [15, 18], in which a coercer can verify whether a
voter has in effect randomized or biased the vote [18]. As
mentioned earlier, these randomization attacks are solved
by Scantegrity II.
The usability of the ballot marking process in any vot-
ing system can affect the accuracy of capturing voter in-
tention. The indirect association of candidate order and
mark order of the Punchscan ballot may conflict with the
voter’s mental model of how a ballot should be marked.
On the other hand, voting systems requiring additional
thought related to marking mechanics can increase the
accuracy with which some voters mark. The experience
of some of the authors using Punchscan in both mock and
binding elections found no significant problems with the
indirection [13].
In any case, Scantegrity [8] sidesteps these poten-
tial usability shortcomings by using a standard, non-
randomized candidate ordering with adjacent bubbles,
such as with conventional optical scan ballots. Each bal-
lot independently associates a code with a particular can-
didate. The receipt therefore is simply a list of the codes
of the selected candidates. This change interfaces di-
rectly with the pre-existing Punchscan anonymizing net-
work [21], but election officials must recover individual
paper ballots to settle disputes, and this leads to a cum-
bersome dispute resolution process in order to preserve
voter privacy. The improvements presented in this paper
eliminate the need for any such physical dispute resolu-
tion process.
The use of invisible ink is related to the concept of bal-
lot casting assurance [1], where correctness of the receipt
is verified by giving a voter a choice to audit it after it is
created but before it is seen, proving to the voter that
(with high probability) the receipt was generated cor-
rectly. This idea is also seen in Scratch & Vote [2] and
Voter Initiated Auditing [3].
3 Voter Experience
Scantegrity II is designed to meet several usability goals.
Firstly and most importantly, the procedures for marking
and casting a Scantegrity II ballot should deviate mini-
mally from those of a conventional optical scan ballot.
Secondly, the presence of a mechanism on the ballot for
producing a receipt should not interfere with the mark-
ing and casting procedures. Finally, the procedures for
producing and checking a receipt should be voluntary.
Here we present a high-level description of the voter
experience for the basic system3:
Sign-in: A person who is eligible to vote is authenti-
cated at the polling place in accordance with ex-
isting procedures governing voter registration. An
authenticated voter is issued a single ballot for the
purpose of voting and is given a decoder pen.
Normal Voting Routine: The voter enters the voting
booth and uses the decoder pen to mark her choices
on the ballot in the same manner as one would for
a conventional optical scan ballot: a vote is indi-
cated by marking a specially reserved region (re-
ferred to as a “bubble”) directly beside the printed
candidate/choice. The voter casts her ballot, again,
in the same manner as one would for a conventional
“precinct” optical scan ballot: a poll worker assists
the voter in inputting the marked ballot into an opti-
cal scanner. The scanner reads the ballot ID and the
states of the bubbles marked; it does not read the
confirmation codes.
Creating a Receipt: The voter can choose to participate
in the voter verification process by creating a receipt
of her vote. To create a receipt, the voter manually
transcribes the revealed confirmation codes onto the
receipt portion of her ballot. Afterwards, the re-
ceipt is indelibly marked as “Ballot Voted” by a poll
worker (e.g., by a rubber stamp). The voter detaches
the receipt from the ballot along a perforation and
retains it for future reference. (It is preferable that
receipts are detached for all ballots, whether or not
the receipts are marked.)
Selecting a Ballot to Audit: During sign-in, a voter can
optionally request an additional ballot for the pur-
pose of auditing the correctness of printing. In this
situation she is offered two ballots from which she
3Note that the voting procedures for the “enhanced” system pre-
sented in Section 7 differ slightly from those of this basic system.
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arbitrarily selects one to audit. This ballot is in-
delibly marked as “Audit Ballot” by the poll official
(e.g., by a rubber stamp) to unambiguously void its
inclusion in the tally. The voter or the poll worker
then uses a decoder pen to reveal all the codes on
the ballot. The voter is allowed to leave the polling
place with this audited ballot for later use in the
voter verification step described in Section 4.9.
Exceptions to the Normal Voting Routine: In
precinct-based optical scan environments, im-
properly marked ballots will be immediately
rejected by the scanning device. If the local
governing procedure allows the voter an additional
attempt, the current ballot must first be invalidated
before a new one is issued. The receipt (which
includes the ballot ID) is detached and stamped as
“Spoiled Ballot” and given to the voter. In order
to protect voter privacy, the ballot itself should be
destroyed in a verifiable manner (e.g., shredded).
Post-Election Voter Verification: During a previously
announced time period after the conclusion of
polling, the voter may check on the election web-
site that election officials have correctly posted the
revealed confirmation codes corresponding to her
ballot ID. She may also check that her audit bal-
lot is printed correctly (see Section 4.9). Also, any
voter or interested party may check the correctness
of the final tally posted on the election web site.
4 The Scantegrity II System
We now describe the details of the basic Scantegrity II
system. We consider an election with a single contest for
concreteness but without loss of generality. Let B be the
number of ballots printed for the election and let N be
the number of candidates. B should be at least double
the size of the voting population to allow for audited and
also spoilt ballots. There is a canonical ordering of the
N candidates, but ballots may optionally be printed with
varying “ballot rotations”.
4.1 The Ballot
The Scantegrity II ballot consists of a voting portion and
a receipt portion, each printed with the ballot’s unique
ID number. The voting portion of the ballot includes a
list of candidate names with an optical mark recognition
field, referred to as a bubble, beside each candidate name.
Each bubble contains a sequence of randomly generated
alphanumeric characters, referred to as a confirmation
code, printed in invisible ink. Figure 1 (left) shows the
confirmation codes on a sample ballot image file for the
printer. Before a ballot is marked, none of the confirma-
tion codes are visible, as shown in Figure 1 (middle). To
indicate a vote for a candidate, the voter marks the bubble
for that candidate with a special decoder pen. Marking
a bubble with the decoder pen reveals the confirmation
code printed inside the bubble and simultaneously leaves
a dark mark that is recognizable by an optical scanner,
as shown in Figure 1 (right). The optical scanner uses
standard dark-mark detection to count a vote for the can-
didate exactly when there is a dark mark in the corre-
sponding bubble.
The receipt portion of the ballot contains space for the
voter to optionally note the confirmation codes revealed
by her selections. For convenience, the receipt portion
may contain the list of contest titles with space next to
each title for the voter to fill in the code. The receipt por-
tion is located across the bottom of the ballot (so that its
perforated edge does not interfere with scanner feeding)
and is easily detachable by the voter along a perforation,
as shown in Figure 1 (right).
Each ballot has a distinct ballot ID which uniquely
identifies the election and the ballot within that elec-
tion. An example ballot ID might be “ST-2008-11-04-
123456789.” For simplicity, in the following examples
we use 4-digit ballot IDs such as “0001.” The ballot ID
is printed on both the voting portion and the receipt por-
tion of the ballot. On the voting portion, the ballot ID
may appear in the form of pre-filled bubbles for each
character of the ID so that the optical scanner can read
the ballot ID without using optical character recognition
(OCR). Figure 1 (right) shows the ballot ID printed on
the voting portion and the receipt portion of the ballot.
(The pre-filled bubbles for the ballot ID are not shown.)
4.2 Confirmation Codes
We require the following properties of the confirmation
codes:
• The confirmation codes are unique within each con-
test on each ballot.
• The confirmation code for each candidate within
each contest on each ballot is uniformly-
pseudorandomly and independently selected
from the set of possible codes (which may be
restricted to eliminate such things as characters that
are commonly confused).
• The confirmation code corresponding to a particu-
lar candidate on a particular ballot is secret and un-
known to the voter until the voter indicates a vote
(i.e., marks the bubble) for that candidate.
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Figure 1: Example Ballot. Left: Printable ballot image with invisible regions specified by a false-color mapping
(magenta and yellow). Middle: Printed paper ballot. The confirmation codes, printed in invisible ink, are initially not
visible. Right: Marked paper ballot and receipt. Marking a bubble with the decoder pen causes the confirmation code
to become visible.
Ballot ID Alice Bob Carl
0001 WT9 7LH JNC
0002 KMT TC3 J3K
0003 CH7 3TW 9JH
0004 WJL KWK H7T
0005 M39 LTM HNN
Table P
Ballot ID
0001 7LH WT9 JNC
0002 J3K TC3 KMT
0003 9JH CH7 3TW
0004 KWK H7T WJL
0005 M39 HNN LTM
Table Q
Flag Q-Pointer S-Pointer
(0005, 1) (2, 1)
(0003, 3) (4, 2)
(0002, 1) (4, 3)
(0001, 3) (3, 3)
(0001, 2) (4, 1)
(0005, 3) (3, 2)
(0004, 2) (5, 3)
(0003, 1) (2, 3)
(0004, 3) (3, 1)
(0002, 3) (1, 1)
(0001, 1) (2, 2)
(0002, 2) (5, 2)
(0004, 1) (1, 2)
(0003, 2) (5, 1)
(0005, 2) (1, 3)
Table R
Alice Bob Carl
Table S
Figure 2: Tables P, Q, R, and S as generated by the election officials before election day. Table P is kept private. The
publicly published versions of tablesQ, R, and S contain commitments to the information shown above. For example,
a vote for Carl on ballot 0002 would reveal the confirmation code J3K. The corresponding row of table R is row 3,
which points to position (0002,1) in table Q and to position (4,3) in table S. Position (4,3) in table S corresponds to a
vote for Carl, since it is in column 3.
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4.3 Election Preparation
Prior to the election, the election officials secret-share a
seed to a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) [26],
and election officials then input their shares to a trusted
workstation (as described in [14]) to jointly generate B ·
N pseudorandom confirmation codes and the following
tables:
P : A table containing the confirmation codes in the or-
der in which they were generated by the PRNG. Ta-
ble P specifies the correspondence between confir-
mation codes and candidates on each ballot. Row i
corresponds to ballot i and column j corresponds to
candidate j, so that the confirmation code in posi-
tion (i, j) is printed on ballot i within the bubble for
candidate j. Table P is never published and is used
to generate table Q.
Q : A table in which the confirmation codes in each row
of P have been pseudorandomly permuted. Thus,
row i corresponds to ballot i, but each column does
not correspond to a fixed candidate. The election
officials commit to each confirmation code in ta-
ble Q and publish these commitments on the elec-
tion website.
R : A table in which each row i corresponds to an un-
derlying confirmation code from Q. Each row con-
tains a flag, which will be raised in the post-election
posting phase if a vote is made for the underlying
confirmation code, and two pseudorandom pointers
— a “Q-pointer” specifying the position of a con-
firmation code in table Q and an “S-pointer” spec-
ifying the position of the same confirmation code
in table S (described below). The election officials
generate these pointers using the PRNG, commit
to each Q-pointer and S-pointer, and publish these
commitments on the election website. Essentially,
table R provides two random shuffles of the confir-
mation codes and will be used in the audit process
via randomized partial checking [17].
S : A table in which each element corresponds to an un-
derlying confirmation code. Each element is a flag,
which will be raised if a vote is made for the under-
lying confirmation code. Each column j contains
the confirmation codes for candidate j. Table S (ini-
tially empty) is published on the election website.
Because the Q- and S-pointers in table R are pseudo-
randomly generated, an element in table Q can map to
any element of table R, which can map to any element of
table S in the column for the corresponding candidate.
As a working example, consider an election withN =
3 candidates, Alice, Bob, and Carl, and B = 5 ballots.
Figure 2 shows how the private tables P,Q,R, and S gen-
erated by the election officials might look before election
day.
4.4 Voting
After checking in at the polling site, the voter asks for ei-
ther one or two Scantegrity II ballots and a decoder pen.
If the voter asks for two ballots, she chooses one arbitrar-
ily to audit (see Section 4.9) and votes on the other one.
Inside the booth, to vote for a candidate, the voter marks
the bubble for that candidate using the decoder pen, si-
multaneously revealing the confirmation code printed in-
side the bubble and leaving a dark mark that is recogniz-
able by the optical scanner.
A voter who is interested in verifying that her vote is
collected as cast may transcribe the revealed confirma-
tion codes onto the receipt portion of the ballot. The
voter detaches the receipt portion of the ballot along a
perforation.
As with conventional optical scan, the voter inserts
her ballot into the optical scanner, which checks that
the voter has not overvoted and that there are no stray
marks. If there is an error, the scanner may reject the
ballot and the voter can then either return to the booth to
make additional marks or obtain a new ballot to vote on.
Otherwise, the scanner accepts the ballot and records the
voter’s choices, along with the ballot ID.
After the voter casts her ballot, a poll worker stamps
the voter’s detached receipt as “Ballot Voted”.
4.5 Posting and Tallying
After the close of polls, the election officials publish a
list of all the voters who voted and the tally given by
the optical scanners. The electronic ballot images from
the scanner and table P are used to translate the votes
into the confirmation codes which were revealed on the
cast ballots. The election officials open the commitments
in table Q to the confirmation codes that have been re-
vealed to voters and flag the entries in tables R and S
corresponding to those codes. Anyone can now compute
the number of votes for each candidate as the sum of the
number of flagged entries in the candidate’s column in
table S. These tallies are checked against those reported
by the optical scanners.
For each row of R, election officials open either the
Q-pointer or the S-pointer, depending on a true random,
publicly verifiable coin flip [11]. This information will
be used to audit the election website via randomized par-
tial checking (see Section 4.8).
For those ballots that were spoiled for audit, election
officials open the commitments to all the information as-
sociated with the ballot, i.e., the confirmation codes in Q
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and the Q- and S-pointers in R.
Suppose ballots 0001 and 0003 are votes for Alice,
ballot 0002 is a vote for Carl, ballot 0005 is a vote for
Bob, and ballot 0004 is spoiled for audit (as described in
Section 4.9). Figure 3 shows how the publicly published
Q, R, and S tables would look at the end of election day.
4.6 Checking Receipts
Once the results are posted, a voter who has made a re-
ceipt of her confirmation codes can go to the election
website and look up her ballot ID. She checks that, in
the row of Q corresponding to her ballot ID, all and only
her confirmation codes appear. Anyone can check that
the opened commitments match the confirmation codes
on the election website. If any of the confirmation codes
from the voter’s receipt does not appear posted in Q, the
voter should file a dispute.
4.7 Dispute Resolution
To file a dispute, the voter must be on the registration
list as being eligible to vote or as having cast a ballot,
and only one dispute may be filed per voter. (If the voter
wishes to allow a third party organization to check her
receipt, she might sign over the right to her dispute.) The
voter provides the ballot ID and a claim of what the cor-
rect confirmation code(s) should be.
Disputes may arise under four general circumstances.
They could be (i) the result of the voter making a tran-
scription error, (ii) a mischievous voter attempting to call
into question the legitimacy of the election, (iii) an error
by the scanner or in the election data, or (iv) evidence of
fraudulent behavior.
The election officials would like to distinguish the lat-
ter two cases from the former two, as the latter two cases
undermine the integrity of the election and should trigger
further investigation. Since voters do not see the confir-
mation codes of the unrevealed candidates on the ballot,
the probability that a code that a voter claims to have
revealed is one of the other codes committed to for her
ballot is very small if the voter made a transcription error
or is merely guessing. The election officials can publicly
open the commitments to the other confirmation codes
for the claimant’s ballot and eliminate from considera-
tion any disputes for which none of the opened codes
matches the claimed code. We consider the remaining
disputes to be “plausible discrepancies.”
Plausible discrepancies could still be the product of
cases (i) or (ii); however, the statistically expected num-
ber of them arising from random guessing is small and
can be quantified. The election officials should set up
a statistical trigger, based on various election parame-
ters, such that if the number of plausible discrepancies
exceeds some threshold, some suitable recourse is insti-
gated.
Here we consider one possible statistical trigger. Con-
sider a single disputed race. Let N be the number of
candidates, C be the code space, D be the number of
disputes filed, and G be number of plausible discrepan-
cies filed. Let p be the probability of randomly guess-
ing a code that constitutes a plausible discrepancy. Then
µ = Dp is the expected value ofG if all filed disputes are
random guesses. We set the trigger τ such that the prob-
ability of obtaining at least τ plausible discrepancies if
all filed disputes are random guesses is less than 1%. We
can use the following bound on the right tail of the bi-
nomial distribution [12]. For any r > µ, Pr[G − µ ≥
r] ≤ (µe/r)r. For example, for N = 5 candidates,
C = 8000 possible codes, and D = 1000 disputes filed,
assuming no scanning error, p = 4/7999 = 0.0005
and µ = 1000 · 0.0005 = 0.5. Using r = 4.5 we get
Pr[G ≥ 5] ≤ (0.5e/4.5)4.5 = 0.0046 < 0.01, so we can
set τ = 5. If at least 5 out of the 1000 disputes filed are
plausible discrepancies, then an investigation should be
instigated. To allow for up to some acceptable rate s of
scanning error, we can incorporate s into the probability
p of guessing a correct code and compute the statistical
trigger as above with the new value of p.
4.8 Checking the Tally
We audit the election website using randomized partial
checking (RPC) [17]. For each element inR, the election
official is asked to open either the Q- or the S-pointer,
depending on a pseudorandom publicly verifiable coin
flip [11].
Any interested party can check that the commitments
are correct, that each revealedQ-pointer in table R either
connects a revealed code in table Q to a flagged element
in table R or connects a hidden code to an unflagged el-
ement, and that each revealed S-pointer in table R ei-
ther connects a flagged element in table R to a flagged
element in table S or connects an unflagged element to
an unflagged element. Essentially, the audit checks that
flags are mapped unchanged from table Q through ta-
ble R to table S.
Finally, any interested party can check that the tally for
each candidate is correctly computed as the total number
of flagged entries in that candidate’s column in table S.
4.9 Auditing Ballots
Auditing of ballots may be done at any point during the
election process. Candidates should pre-audit a random
sample of the ballots prior to election day. On election
day, voters may obtain two ballots and audit a random
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Ballot ID
0001 WT9
0002 J3K
0003 CH7
0004 KWK H7T WJL
0005 LTM
Table Q
Flag Q-Pointer S-Pointer
(2,1)
(0003,3)
X (4,3)
(3,3)
X (0001,2)
X (0005,3)
(0004,2) (5,3)
(2,3)
(0004,3) (3,1)
(0002,3)
(0001,1)
(0002,2)
(0004,1) (1,2)
X (5,1)
(0005,2)
Table R
Alice Bob Carl
X
X X
X
Table S
Figure 3: Tables Q, R, and S as published after the close of the election. For each revealed confirmation code in table
Q, the row corresponding to that code in table R and the element corresponding to that code in table S have been
flagged. For each row of table R, either the commitment to theQ-pointer or the commitment to the S-pointer has been
opened and published. Note that the revealed confirmation codes in table Q (other than those for ballot 0004, which is
a ballot chosen for audit), the rows flagged in table R, and the flags in table S are in one-to-one correspondence.
one and vote with the other. At the end of the day, any
remaining blank ballots may also be audited.
When a ballot is selected to be audited, a pollworker
stamps the ballot as “Audit Ballot” on both the voting
portion and the receipt portion and all of the confirmation
codes on the ballot are revealed using a decoder pen. We
will refer to the person checking an audited ballot as the
auditor. The auditor checks that the confirmation codes
are unique within each race. After election officials open
the commitments to the confirmation codes in Q and the
Q- and S-pointers for those confirmation codes, the au-
ditor checks that the published confirmation codes match
those revealed on the paper ballot, and that the published
pointers map each confirmation code in Q to the appro-
priate candidate column in S.
5 Security and Privacy Discussion
Scantegrity II provides improved integrity properties
over the underlying optical scan system and only mini-
mally impacts the privacy and ballot secrecy properties.
We provide a high-level sketch of several common at-
tacks and the countermeasures Scantegrity II utilizes in
thwarting them.
In our threat model, an adversary could be any party,
including a voter, pollworker, or election official. The
goal of the adversary is to attack the integrity of the elec-
tion or exert undue influence over a voter. We do not con-
sider attack vectors applicable to all voting systems, such
as denial of service attacks, given that these attacks and
countermeasures are not unique to Scantegrity II. Fur-
thermore, we note that the security of Scantegrity II is
equivalent in many regards to that of Punchscan and the
original Scantegrity, for which security analyses are al-
ready present in academic literature [14, 8]. We split our
discussion of threats into those that affect integrity and
those that affect privacy and ballot secrecy.
5.1 Integrity
Integrity of an election refers to the inability of an ad-
versary to modify votes undetectably. Compared to
conventional optical scan, Scantegrity II provides im-
proved ability to detect an attacker attempting to affect
the integrity of an election by modifying ballots, creat-
ing fraudulent ballots, or attempting to change the tally
on the election website.
5.1.1 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions for the integrity of
the system:
1. A minimally sufficient number of voters will check
their receipts and audit ballots.
2. The system uses a cryptographic commitment func-
tion that is computationally binding.
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3. Observers monitor the election website and can im-
mediately save and detect changes.
4. An effective voter registration system is used.
5. Auditors will not collude with the election officials.
5.1.2 Adding or Deleting Votes
In order to add ballots to the tally, an adversary would
need to add names to the list of voters who voted, in
addition to changing the number of voters reported by
polling sites. If an adversary attempts to add a signifi-
cant number of ballots this should be easily detected by
someone.
An adversary might attempt to delete ballots from the
bulletin board by marking voted ballots as spoiled for au-
dit and publishing all of the information associated with
those ballots. Then he runs the risk of the voters of those
ballots checking the election website and protesting that
their ballots were incorrectly posted as spoiled for audit,
providing their stamped receipts as proof.
If an adversary adds more marks to a ballot after it
has been cast, it can be detected by public observation
of the election website if the additional marks turned a
valid ballot into an overvoted one. Some optical scan
systems prevent this attack because they do not accept
overvoted ballots, but the adversary could add a mark to
a ballot which was originally an undervote. This can be
detected by the voter of that ballot, but the voter has no
proof that the mark was added later. One way to address
this is to always include a “None of the above” option on
each race, which voters could optionally mark to submit
an undervote.
5.1.3 Fraudulent Ballots
There are several types of fraudulent ballots that the elec-
tion officials could create or that an adversary could sub-
stitute for properly constructed ballots:
• There are repeated confirmation codes within a sin-
gle race on a ballot. This means that even if the cor-
rect confirmation code is posted, a voter cannot be
assured that her vote was collected as cast because
multiple candidates may share the same confirma-
tion code.
• The confirmation codes on the ballot are printed in a
different order from that specified by the P table, or
the Q- and S-pointers for the codes on the ballot do
not map the codes to the correct candidate columns
in S. This means that even if the correct confirma-
tion code is posted, a voter cannot be assured that
her vote was collected as cast because the confirma-
tion code may be for a different candidate.
• The ballot may be completely invalid, e.g., the con-
firmation codes on the ballot do not match the con-
firmation codes committed to, in any order.
In all of these cases, the fraudulent ballots can be de-
tected by the cut-and-choose auditing of the ballots. If
a random half of the ballots are audited, no more than a
few fraudulent ballots should go undetected.
More precisely, if there are B total ballots, F fraudu-
lent ballots, and A ballots are audited, then the probabil-
ity that the adversary will go undetected is
(
B−F
A
)
/
(
B
A
)
,
which can be straightforwardly shown to be upper
bounded bymin[(1−A/B)F , (1− F/B)A].
5.1.4 Modifying the Tally
An adversary may try to change the vote tally by flipping
flags in Q, R, or S, so that counting the flags for each
candidate in table S gives an incorrect tally. This can
be detected by the randomized partial checking of the
Q- and S-pointers in R. The probability of an adversary
modifying k pointers going undetected is 1/2k.
5.2 Privacy
Privacy refers to the inability of an attacker to link a
voter’s candidate choices to the voter. Modeling privacy
in a voting system requires strong assumptions due to
the wide variety of physical attacks that could violate
voter privacy in any voting system. Given our assump-
tions, Scantegrity II offers the same privacy protection as
for conventional optical scan systems. However, privacy
concerns arise if these assumptions are relaxed. The en-
hancements presented in Section 7 address these privacy
concerns.
5.2.1 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions for the privacy of
the system.
1. There are no recording devices in the polling booth.
2. Voters cannot read the confirmation codes unless
they mark the corresponding bubble.
3. The system uses a cryptographic commitment func-
tion that is computationally hiding [20].
4. Procedural mechanisms including strict manage-
ment of access to ballot boxes are enforced.
5. Election officials use a special trusted computer
workstation (as described in [14]) to enforce the pri-
vacy of the tables of confirmation codes.
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5.2.2 Randomized Partial Checking
For each code, either the Q-pointer or the S-pointer is
revealed. Suppose the Q-pointer for a particular code is
revealed. Then the index of the code in table S is one of
those not pointed to by a revealed S-pointer. Similarly,
if the Q-pointer for a code is not revealed, then the S-
pointer is revealed, so the index of the code in table S is
one of those pointed to by a revealed S-pointer. Thus, the
randomized partial checking of the pointers hides each
voter’s vote equally among a randomly selected half of
the votes.
5.2.3 Receipts
Because the confirmation codes are randomly generated,
randomly assigned to candidates, and independent across
different ballots, and the commitment function is compu-
tationally hiding, a voter’s receipt of confirmation codes
does not reveal how she voted. As a result, an attacker
cannot coerce a voter to vote one way or another without
prior knowledge of the ballot she receives and the codes
on that ballot.
If the generation of the confirmation codes or the se-
crecy of the private information in the tables is compro-
mised, an adversary could violate a voter’s privacy. If
an adversary obtains access to cast ballot forms and ob-
tains the ballot ID used by a voter, he will be able to
determine that voter’s choices. To address these threats,
we make the assumptions that no recording devices are
present in the polling booth and chain-of-custody pro-
cedures are enforced to ensure that an adversary does
not have access to the ballot boxes. Further countermea-
sures are possible, for example, ensuring that the ballot
ID on the cast portion of the ballots is difficult to extract.
One possibility is to encrypt the ballot ID or make it not
human-readable.
6 Invisible Ink Printing Process
Both the ballot and confirmation codes are printed before
voting takes place. Three types of inks are employed for
this purpose. Conventional (e.g., black) ink is used for
primary printing of candidate names, instructions, other
text, etc. For the purposes of printing confirmation codes,
two specialty inks are employed: a reactive invisible ink
and an unreactive color-matched dummy ink.
The term “invisible ink” refers to an ink with the fol-
lowing properties:
• In its initial chemical state, its pigmentation is of
low visual contrast to the print medium (i.e., paper).
• When combined with a developer ink, an irre-
versible reaction occurs, changing the pigmentation
of the ink to be of high visual contrast to the print
medium.
• In its activated state, it must be sufficiently pig-
mented to be clearly visible to an optical scanner
and the human eye.
However, the term “invisible ink” is a misnomer in the
sense that any liquid (though not necessarily pigmented)
will subtly change the reflective characteristics of the
print medium through the printing process, meaning the
presence of letters printed in invisible ink also will still
potentially be visually perceptible. For this reason we
employ a dummy ink with the following properties:
• It is color-matched to the initial pigmentation char-
acteristics of the invisible ink such that the inks are
visually indistinguishable.
• Contact with the developer ink will produce negli-
gible pigmentation change so as to be in high visual
contrast to the activated ink such that the inks be-
come readily visually distinguishable.
We define a matrix of pixels for the purposes of print-
ing the confirmation codes inside the optical scan bub-
bles. Pixels that form the “foreground” confirmation
code characters are printed in one ink, while the remain-
ing “background” pixels are printed in the other ink. In
order to produce the darkest average color density of a
marked optical scan bubble (and therefore most visible
to the scanner), the background pixels are printed with
the invisible ink, and the foreground pixels are printed in
the unreactive dummy ink. Therefore when marked by
the decoder pen, the bubble will contain lightly colored
letters against a dark background.
The developer ink is incorporated into a felt-tipped
“highlighter” style marker casing along with a basic yel-
low pigment to provide voters with visual feedback as to
where they have marked. We have implemented the in-
visible ink printing process using an Epson C88+ color
inkjet printer in which we replace the manufacturer-
supplied yellow and magenta inks with the reactive and
non-reactive inks respectively. Electronic files used for
ballot printing are prepared in this false-color mapping
whereby yellow and magenta colored objects in the digi-
tal file will print in reactive and non-reactive inks respec-
tively. This process is depicted in Figure 4.
7 Enhancements to the Basic System
In this section, we suggest ways to improve the basic
Scantegrity II system described thus far. One enhance-
ment allows all information on the ballot to be humanly-
visible only within a short window of time. Another
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Figure 4: Invisible Ink Printing Process.
improvement allows information seen by the voter to be
sufficient for the voter to complain, thereby reducing the
efficacy of attacks in which physical receipt may be ob-
tained from voters.
In the basic system, uniquely identifiable codes are
left on the paper ballots at the conclusion of the elec-
tion, making manual recounts potentially useful in im-
proper influence schemes, such as vote buying and co-
ercion. Even though manual recounts are a weaker in-
tegrity guarantee than that offered by the Scantegrity II
audit, it is preferable to be able to allow both. Our
first enhancement, designed to permit recounts, utilizes
a “slow-reacting” invisible ink—created by diluting the
concentration of the reactants in the normal invisible ink
or introducing a chemical inhibitor. When brought into
contact with the developer ink, this ink has a much lower
reaction rate—on the order of tens of minutes instead of
fractions of a second. By replacing the dummy ink on the
foreground pixels of each confirmation code on a ballot
with slow-reacting ink, a bubble undergoes an immedi-
ate reaction upon marking, making the codes visible to
the voter. A slow reaction will, however, gradually (e.g.,
over 15 minutes) begin to fade the foreground pixels of
the confirmation code to an indistinguishable color, fill-
ing in the bubble completely and hiding the confirmation
code. The ballots can then be re-scanned and/or manu-
ally counted or recounted, as often as desired, without
revealing confirmation codes to the persons involved.
When a ballot is audited, the confirmation codes can
be revealed using one of the decoder pens used for voting
(to audit the effectiveness of the pen) or taken home by
the voter and developed if she has access to the ink. To
prevent the confirmation codes from fading, the voter can
choose to apply a fixative, by spraying or sponging her
ballot, that completely inhibits the slow-reacting ink and
preserves the codes.
Disputes in the basic system require physical posses-
sion of a stamped receipt. The second enhancement
allows for informational disputes, where a voter need
only know her confirmation codes in order to prove that
her ballot is misrepresented online. Further, to prevent
the threat of voted ballots being turned into audited or
spoiled ballots without stamped receipts, two additional
“authenticated ballot status” codes are added to the bal-
lot. These status codes are the same size as the confirma-
tion codes, are committed to prior to the election, printed
on the ballot in slow-reacting ink, and are individually
detachable (e.g., using a perforation). If a ballot is cho-
sen for a print audit by the voter, one of these codes is
developed by the poll worker and the other detached and
destroyed—which one is the choice of the voter. If a bal-
lot is chosen to be voted on, both codes are retained on
the ballot, detached prior to feeding the ballot into the
optical scanner, and developed by the poll worker after
the ballot is successfully cast. Within a few minutes, the
voter is able to read the codes. If the ballot is spoiled
(e.g., the voter overvoted and is issued another ballot),
the chit is returned by the voter and checked as matching
the ballot being spoiled and then both codes are shred-
ded without being developed. If a voter later finds that
11
her cast ballot has been misrepresented as an audited or
spoiled ballot on the website, knowledge of both of the
codes is necessary and sufficient for proving the ballot
was voted, indicating malfeasance or error. Similarly, if
a voter discovers that her audited vote has been misrep-
resented as a voted or spoiled ballot, knowledge of one
code is sufficient to prove that the ballot was not spoiled
and knowledge of all the confirmation codes is sufficient
to prove that the ballot was not voted on.4 In order to
dispute an incorrect confirmation code that appears on-
line, the voter need only know a proper code and does
not need to actually have the physical receipt (stamped
or otherwise). Given that voters are provided adequate
time in the booth to memorize or copy the codes, ob-
taining a voter’s stamped receipt after the election is not
sufficient to prevent the voter from detecting an error on
the election website and filing a successful dispute.
Since no physical evidence is required for a dispute,
the dispute resolution process does not have to occur in
person and the voter can file an online petition instead
(optionally anonymously). This may be advantageous
in situations where the voter has reason to fear retribu-
tion for reporting errors. To prevent the system from be-
ing what may be called “flooded” with spurious com-
plaints, sensible precautions can be taken to eliminate
blatantly fraudulent claims, including CAPTCHAs and
limits on complaints per IP address. If dispute flood-
ing occurs, however, the resolution can move to a second
phase where candidates or political parties are allocated
a fixed number of complaints per flooded ballot and can
then choose the most plausible complaints as they prefer.
These improvements do not interfere with Scantegrity
II’s ability to be used in central-scan environments. As
the scanner does not need to record the confirmation
codes, since the positions marked are sufficient to recon-
struct the codes, ballots may be scanned after the slow-
reacting ink has hidden the confirmation codes. This is
useful for precincts that lack scanning equipment, as is
the case in many developing democracies. Scantegrity
II can also augment hand-counted elections by allowing
the ballot-counting to proceed as usual, and then provid-
ing the ability for the ballots to be centrally scanned after
the election to ensure end-to-end integrity.
8 Conclusions
Scantegrity II provides voters with a familiar optical scan
voting experience as well as an option to verify that their
ballots “make it, as intended, all the way.” This end-
to-end verification capability enables election officials to
4An additional two codes could be added in a similar fashion to
prove that spoiled ballots are not misrepresented as voted or audited
ballots; however, mere detection of this threat, in lieu of prevention, is
a marginal improvement as previously outlined.
provide the highest level of assurance that outcomes are
correct and in a way that is visible to voters. The system
also improves on its predecessor by removing the need
to recover paper ballots in resolving disputes about the
information posted on the election website and allows
for manual recount.
While further testing and development are planned,
Scantegrity II holds promise of being the first end-to-end
voting system to come into use in public sector elections.
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